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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**
Conflicting Decisions

MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
SALES AS FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES-DOES THE 1984
ACT MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

In 1980, real estate practitioners
were thrown into a state of shock
when the Court of Appeals for the
The comprehensive changes to Fifth Circuit in Durrett v. Washthe Bankruptcy Code resulting ington National Insurance Co. 2
from the Bankruptcy Amend- held that a debtor in possession
ments and Federal Judgeship Act could avoid a transfer of real
of 1984 (1984 Act) 1 touch almost property made by means of a nonevery area of bankruptcy prac- judicial foreclosure of a deed of
tice. In fact, it is difficult to ascer- trust within one year before banktain the extent and impaat of ruptcy. The property was sold for
many of the amendments because only 57.7 percent of its fair market
of lingering uncertainties regard- value and, therefore, the court
ing their applicability. Needless to held that the price was not the
say, bankruptcy courts will be reasonably equivalent value of the
busy defining the reach of the new property within the meaning of
legislation.
Section 548(a)(2). 3 It is easy to see
One of the open questions re- how the Durrett decision causes
lates to the avoidance of a prebankruptcy real estate mortgage
1 Pub. L. No. 98-353 (July 10, 1984).
foreclosure sale as a fraudulent Most of the substantive amendments to
conveyance when a noncollusive the Bankruptcy Code, including those discussed in this article, apply to cases comand regularly conducted sale pro- menced
on or after October 8, 1984.
duces a price that is less than the
z 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). Other
reasonably equivalent value of the cases that have followed the reasoning in
Durrett are, e.g., Abramson v. Lakewood
property.
Bank & Trust, 647 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.
* Distinguished Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University School of
Law, Hempstead, New York; associate
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
** Professor of Law, Hofstra University
School of Law, Hempstead, New York;
associated with the law firm of Moritt,
Wolfeld & Resnick, Garden City, New
York; associate member of the National
Bankruptcy Conference.

1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982);
In re Richardson, 23 Bankr. 434 (D. Utah
1982); In re Perdido Bay Country Club
Estates, Inc., 23 Bankr. 36 (S.D. Fla.
1982); see also In re Hulm, 738 F.2d 328
(8th Cir. 1984).
3 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2). In essence, this
section permits a trustee to avoid a transfer of the debtor's interest in property
made while the debtor is insolvent and
within one year prior to bankruptcy for
"less than a reasonably equivalent value."
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considerable uncertainty regarding the title obtained at a mortgage
foreclosure sale for at least one
year following the sale.4
The Ninth Circuit Appellate
Panel, however, disagreed with
Durrett and held in In re Madrid 5
that a noncollusive and regularly
conducted mortgage foreclosure
sale, in and of itself, renders the
price the fair equivalent of the
value of the property. The court
of appeals affirmed the Madrid
decision, but reasoned that the
transfer of property sold at a foreclosure sale actually dates back to
the time the original deed of trust
was perfected and, therefore, may
be removed from the one-year
fraudulent conveyance period under Section 548. 6 In any event,
as long as courts are in disagreement on the avoidability of such
4 Although § 548 applies to transfers
made within one year prior to bankruptcy,
the passage of one year does not necessarily remove the threat of avoidance. By virtue of § 544(b), the trustee or debtor in
possession may use the rights of an actual
unsecured creditor who, under state law,
could have avoided the foreclosure sale as
a fraudulent conveyance. In this regard, it
is interesting to note that the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws recently adopted the official
text of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act, which clearly rejects the Durrett holding. In states which adopt the new Transfer Act, the price received at a noncollusive and regularly conducted foreclosure
sale will be deemed reasonably equivalent
value regardless of the market value of the
property.
5 21 Bankr. 424 (9th Cir. A.P. 1982).
6 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984); see also
In re Alsop, 14 Bankr. 982 (Alaska 1981),
ajf'd, 22 Bankr. 1017 (Alaska 1982).

foreclosure sales, the cloud over
the title obtained at these sales
will continue.
Did Congress in the 1984 Act
address and resolve the uncertainty regarding the Durrett issue?
Does the recent legislation either
adopt or r~j9Ct the reasoning of
the court or appeals in Madrid?
Mter the 1984 Act, can Section
548 be used to avoid a noncollusive and regularly conducted
mortgage foreclosure sale because
the price paid is less than the
property's reasonably equivalent
value? The only clear answer
which could be given to these
questions is maybe.
The 1984 Act

The 1984 Act contains two
provisions which could, at first
glance, lead to the conclusion that
Congress intended to reject Madrid and codify the holding in
Durrett. First, the introductory
language of Section 548(a) was
amended to clarify that the section applies to "voluntary or involuntary'' transfers. 7 Why would
Congress add this clarification unless it wanted to emphasize that
an involuntary taking of the debtor's property (i.e., a mortgage
foreclosure) is subject to Section
548 on fraudulent conveyances? It
is interesting to note that this
amendment was entirely unnecessary in view of Section 101, which
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7

Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 463(a}(l).
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already had defined "transfer" in
the Code to include the voluntary and involuntary parting with
property.
The second relevant amendment contained in the 1984 Act
added the language "and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption" to the definition of
"transfer" in Section 101. 8 On its
face, this change appears to be a
clear rejection of the Ninth Circuit
Appellate Panel's holding in Madrid and a direction to bankruptcy
courts to consider a foreclosure
sale as a transfer that is separate
and distinct from the original
transfer of the mortgage lien
which occurred when the deed of
trust was perfected. When these
two statutory amendments are
examined, it appears that the 1984
Act supports the Durrett holding,
at least to the extent of rendering
mortgage foreclosure sales subject to the avoiding power of Section 548.
Nonetheless, there are two reasons why practitioners should not
jump to the conclusion that Durrett is clearly applicable to all new
cases by virtue of the 1984 Act.
First, although the recent amendments state that "foreclosure of
the debtor's equity of redemption" is a "transfer" and that Section 548 applies to both voluntary
and involuntary transfers, the
1984 Act does not expressly address the question of whether the
8

Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 421(i).
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price received at a noncollusive
and regularly conducted foreclosure sale will, in and of itself,
be deemed reasonably equivalent
value as a matter of law. Therefore, Congress appears to have
made prebankruptcy foreclosure
sales subject to the strict scrutiny
of bankruptcy courts (thus rejecting the court of appeals's decision
in Madrid) without affecting the
standards with which the avoidability of such foreclosure sales
should be determined.
Senatorial Interpretations
Another reason for doubting
those who are convinced that the
1984 Act codifies the Durrett holding is contained in the Congressional Record9 where a discussion between Senator DeConcini and Senator Dole was reported as follows:
Mr. DECONCINI. Apparently
there may have been some misunderstanding regarding the effect
of certain technical amendments
made by the recently enacted bankruptcy legislation, Public Law 98353, specifically section 421(i),
which amended the definition of
transfer in the Bankruptcy Code11 U.S.C. section 101(48) in the
new legislation-to add the phrase
"and foreclosure of the debtor's
equity of redemption,"; and section 467(a)(l), which amended section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code

9 130 Cong. Rec.
13771-13772, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 5, 1984).
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to add the phrase "voluntarily or
involuntarily." A question has
arisen whether these amendments
somehow support the position
taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in Durrett v.
Washington National Insurance
Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980),
where the court held that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale could be set
aside in bankruptcy if the sale price
was not sufficiently high. My understanding is that these provisions
were not intended to have any effect one way or the other on the so
called Durrett issue. Is my understanding correct?
Mr. DOLE. The Senator's understanding is indeed correct.
As the Senator knows, Senator
THURMOND's amendment in the
nature of a substitute to H.R. 5174,
when introduced, contained language that would have overturned
the position represented by the
Durrett decision. Senator METZENBAUM, however, believed that
no action should be taken on the
Durrett issue until the Judiciary
Committee had an opportunity to
hold hearings on the issue and consider the matter thoroughly. In deference to Senator METZENBAUM's
position, Senator THURMOND agreed
to delete from his amendment all
provisions dealing with the Durrett
issue, and so stated on the floor on
June 19-CoNGRESSIONAL RECORD
at page S7617. Consequently, no
provision of the bankruptcy bill as
passed by this body was intended
to intimate any view one way or the
other regarding the correctness of
the position taken by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the Durrett case, or regard-
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ing the correctness of the position
taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in Lawyers
Title Insurance Corp. v. Madrid,
725 F2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984), which
reached a contrary result.
The first provision, which amends
the definition of "transfer" contained in section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code, appears to provide
tllat certain foreclosures are included within the definition of
"transfer." It does not purport to
deal with whether such a transfer
will fall within the scope of section
548(a)(2), which was the subject of
the ninth circuit's decision, nor
with the question of when a transfer occurs for purposes of section
548. Under section 548(d)(l), the
transfer occurs on the date of the
perfection of the mortgage or deed
of trust, for after such date no bona
fide purchaser from the mortgagor
could take priority over the rights
of a purchaser at the foreclosure
sale. Those courts following Durrett have found and held that the
former definition of "transfer" in
section 101(41) was broad enough
to include a foreclosure sale of the
debtor's property while courts rejecting Durrett on the basis of the
date of transfer, have done so
under section 548( d)(l) and not section 101(41). Thus, the amendment
should not be construed to in any
way codify Durrett or throw a
cloud over noncollusive foreclosure sales.
The second provision, which
adds "voluntarily or involuntarily"
to section 548(a) is consistent with
the majority holding in Madrid. Finally, neither of the provisions
purport to deal with the question of
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whether a noncollusive, regularly
conducted foreclosure sale should
be deemed to be for a reasonably
equivalent value.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Then I am
correct in concluding that parties in
bankruptcy proceedings who seek
avoidance of prepetition foreclosure sales would find no support for
their arguments in these amendments?
Mr. DOLE. The Senator's conclusion is correct.
Conclusion

It remains to be seen whether
these remarks will be deemed conclusive when bankruptcy courts
faced with the Durrett issue in the
future must decide whether any
weight should be given to the 1984
Act. These comments are not
called "legislative history" because they were made more than
three months after Congress
passed the statute. Although both
senators played a significant role
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in the adoption of the 1984 Act,
nonetheless they are unable to
express the intention of the remaining members of Congress
who never spoke on the issue.
Moreover, while denying that
Madrid is overruled by the 1984
Act, these remarks do not suggest
any alternative rationale for adding "foreclosure of the debtor's
equity of redemption" to the
definition of "transfer" in Section
101. The senators' remarks leave
the issues in limbo. It wopl,d be
more consistent with stat<; law
and the practical problems in selling property at a foreclosure sale
that the Bankruptcy Code follow
the recently adopted official text
of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, which clearly rejects
the Durrett holding. After all, Section 548 was modeled upon the
UFCA. 10
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See note 4 supra.

